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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**
No body of law interrelates
with the Bankruptcy Code more
than the Uniform Commercial
Many cases reflecting the inter- Code. Determining the rights of a
relationship between bankruptcy secured creditor, for example, reand nonbankruptcy law are found quires an understanding of Article
in the current bankruptcy report- 9 of the UCC. Clearly, the extent
under the
ers. La11or law, environmental of the trustee's reach
2 cannot be
"strong-arm
clause"
protection statutes, product liability principles, real estate law, and ascertained without evaluating the
contract doctrines are only a few rights of a judicial lien creditor as
of the areas that have become im- against a competing secured credportant in the processing of a itor under the UCC.J Similarly,
bankruptcy case. Of course, this compliance with the bulk sale
interrelationship of bankruptcy provisions of Article 6 of the U CC
and nonbankruptcy law has been is relevant when determining
appreciated for many years as whether the trustee, standing in
reflected more than thirty years the shoes of an unsecured crediago in the comments of a learned tor,4 could avoid prebankruptcy
bulk transfers.
co~mentator: "The interdependence of non-bankruptcy and
In re AIC Photos, Inc.
bankruptcy rights and remedies is
There is no doubt that the intersuch that an evaluation of one set
of remedies presupposes familiar- relationship of bankruptcy law
and the U CC was intended by
ity with others." 1
Congress when enacting the
Bankruptcy Code. One of the
clearest illustrations of this delib* Counsel to the law firm of Levin & erate interdependence relates to
-Weintraub & Crames, New York City;
member of the National Bankruptc;y Con- the rights of the reclaiming seller
ference.
who delivered goods to the debtor
** Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished shortly before bankruptcy. s HowProfessor of Bankruptcy Law Hofstra
DEFINITION OF "INSOLVENT"
FOR RECLAMATION PURPOSES:
BANKRUPTCY CODE vs. UCC

\

University School of Law, H~mpstead,
~ew Yqrk; associate member of the Natlol,lal Bankruptcy Conference.
1
J. Moore, Debtors' and Creditors'
Rights, Preface (1955 ed.).

11 U.S.C. § 544(a).
See U.C.C. § 9-301.
4
11 u.s.c. § 544(b).
s See 11 U.S.C. § 546(c); U.C.C.
§ 2-'/02(2). For a discussion of other as-
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FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS

ever, this area also illustrates. how
the extentto which the UCC controls bankruptcy issues is sometimes ambiguous. Such ambiguity
is reflected in the recent reclamation proceeding in In re AIC
Photos, Inc. 6
In AIC Photo, a creditor instituted an adversary proceeding to
reclaim certain goods delivered to
the debtor on credit only two days
prior to the commencement of the
debtor's chapter 11 case. Most of
the essential facts regarding -the
seller's right to reclaim were undisputed. The seller had made a
written demand for the return of
the delivered equipment in accordance with Section 546(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code and Section
2-702(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in New
York. Th~ debtor had not complied with the seller's demand. By
stipulating to the use of evidence
previously taken in the bankruptcy case regarding the debtor's
financial condition, there was no
dispute that ''the sum of its [the
debtor's] debts was not greater
than the fair value of all of its assets. "7 The parties also agreed
that reclamation rights are based
exclusively on Section 546(c) of
the Bankruptcy Code and Section
2-702(2) of the UCC, and that
under both sections the right to
reclaim exists only if the debtor
pects of the seller's right to recl~m goods,
see B. Weintraub & A. Resmck, Bankruptcy Law Manual~ 5.12 (rev. ed. 1986).
6 57 Bankr. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
'Id. at 57.

received the goods while insolvent.
Definition of "Insolvency"

Although the parties agreed that
the term "insolvent" is controlled
by Section 1-201(23) of. the UCC,
the bankruptcy court nonetheless
focused on the legal question
whether the term "insolvency" is
to be defined by the DCC or by
the Bankrdptcy Code for reclamation purposes.
Before arriving at its conclusions of law, the court yonsidered
the intention of Congress "to recognize, in part, the validity of Section 2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which has generated much litigation, confusion
and divergent decisions in different circuits. " 8 This was done by
making the rights and powers of
the trustee under the various JlOO·
visions of the Bankruptcy Code
subordinate to those of a reclaiming creditor. "To exercise a right
of reclamation, the seller must
demand reclamation of such
goods 'before ten days after the
receipt of such goods by the
debtor.' In lieu of actual reclamation, the Court may grant the
seller a priority claim or lien. " 9
The court observed that "[t]here
would be no doubt in this case
that [the seller] came within the
protection of § 546(c) were it
•Id. at 58 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 371-372 (1977)).
9 Id. at 58.
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not for the ambiguity created by
the requirement that the debtor
have received the goods being reclaimed 'while insolvent' " 1 0
since insolvency is defined differently in the Uniform Commercial
Code than it is in the Bankruptcy
Code. Under Section 1-201(23) of
th~ UC:C, a ''person is 'insolvent'
who either has ceased to pay his
debts in the ordinary course of
business or cannot pay his debts
as tpey become due or is insolvent
within the meaning of the Federal
Bankruptcy Law." 11 It is to be
noted that the UCC contains both
the so-called equity definition and
the bankruptcy definition, rpaking
the insolvency definition as broad
and all-inclusive as possible.
What the UCC designates as
"federal bankruptcy law," a nondescriptive term, is the Bankruptcy Code, whose definition is
limited to the extent that" 'insolvent' means-with reference to an
entity, other than a partnership,
financial condition such that the
sum of such entity's debts is
greater than all such entity's property' at a fair valuation . . . . "12
In other words, the bankruptcy insolvency test is limited in
scope to the so-called balance
sheet definition.
By stating that the controlling
definition of insolvency is the one
contained in the UCC, instead of
!d.
!d. (quoting U.C.C. § 101(23)).
' 12 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(29).
10
11
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the bankruptcy balance sheet test,
the bankruptcy court disagreed
with a prestigious ~ommentator:
"No less an authority than Colliers has suggested that this difference in definition is fatal to a seller
unable to establish an excess of
liabilities over assets. . .. " 13 The
court then observed that Colliers,
however, "supplies no reasons
for a result which would seem
to create as much confusion as
§ 546(c) was enacted to dissipate."14
The reasons for the court's
conclusion include the difficulty
and complexity of ascertaining the
debtor's assets and liabilities,
both "factually and legally";
many debtors seek long extensions of time to file schedules
"because of the difficulty they
have in determining their own assets and liabilities." 15 Requiring
"a supplier, a stranger to the
debtor's affairs, to carry the burden of proving excess of liabilities
over assets .... woul(i be to make
the right of reclamation largely illusory'' and would de teat Congress's "express intention in
enacting the Code [which] was to
recognize the right of reclamation
created by § 2-702 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.'' 16
The court conceded that Congress intended to recognize UCC
IJ 57 Bankr. at 59 (citing 4 Colliers on
Bankruptcy ~ 546.04 (15th ed. 1985)).
14 57 Bankr. at 59.
15 !d.
16 !d.
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Section 2- 702(2) "in part," but the
part ;hat was being eliminated in
bankruptcy is the part of section
2-702(2) which excuses the ten
day demand limitation when the
right to reclaim is based on the
debtor's written misrepresentation of insolvency made within
three months before delivery.
"But there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that Congress intended to cut back the
right of reclamation still further
and to allow it only in a fraction of
the cases falling within the ten day
rule." 17 To recognize a right of
reclamation only where the buyer
satisfies one of the three tests of
insolvency set forth in the UCC
"would be to radically reduce the
right of reclamation without explanation or justification even as
Congress says it is recognizing
it."IS
The court concluded its discussion of insolvency with the statement that whether or not there is a
right to reclaim depends upon
state law subject to the added limitation that the demand must be
made within ten days after receipt. The court considered the
phrase ''if the debtor has received
such goods while insolvent" as
part of the larger descriptive
wording of the right that is being
elevated above the trustee's powers, namely, the common law or
statutory right to reclaim the
goods.
17
18

/d.
/d.
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Observation
In the AIC Photo case, the
cq_urt went outside the Bank-'
ruptcy Code in search of a definition which was clearly set forth in
the Bankruptcy Code. While the
court's logic is sound and experience indicates that the road toward reclamation is often a tortuous one if the hills of the balance
sheet test are to be' traversed
nonetheless, there is little support'
for the conclusion that a reclamation under§ 546(c) is satisfied with
an equity definition when the
Bankruptcy Code provides the
balance sheet test under § 101
(29).19

One can easily argue thai if
Congress desired to ease the re~lai~ing seller's burden of provIng msolvency' it could have expressly included in Section 546(c) a
se?arate equity test definition applicable to that section only. Indeed, several Code sections contain their own definitions applicable to that section only. For example, Section 547(a)(2) defines
"new value" for pref~rence pur,
poses only, while Section 548(d)
(2)(A) defines ''value'' for fraudu~ent transfer purposes only. There
·~ no doubt that Congress recogruzed the inability to pay debts
19
See In re Flagstaff Foodservice
Corp., 56 Bankr. 899, 905 (S.D.N.Y.
1986?: "The definitional sections ... are
apphcable to all provisions of the Bankl"!lptcy ~ode .... Accordingly, the question of msolve~cy i~ to be determined by
the test enunctated m Section 101(26)."
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as a test in other contexts, such
as the ground for involuntary
bankruptcy under Section 303(h).
Finally, Congress could have
eased the seller's task on the insolvency issue by including in
Section 546(b) a subsection placing the burden of proof on the
debtor. Paraphrasing from a similar provision contained in Section
547(f) relating to preferences, Section 546(b) could have provided as
follows: "For the purposes of this
section, the debtor is presumed to
have been insolvent at the time of
the receipt of the goods." The
burden would be on the debtor to
prove solvency, which is where it
should be, when goods are received so close to the commencement df a bankruptcy case.
The question whether the court
should use a UCC definition when
interpreting a term used in the
Bankruptcy Code requires a different response when the Bankruptcy Code does not contain its
own,definition. The Marin Motor
Oi/ 20 case is a good example of the
appropriate use of a 'ucc definition to interpret the seller's right
of reclamation under Section
546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. In
Marin Motor Oil, the seller of oil
dispatched a reclamation demand
by telex. The issue to be resolved
was whether the "demand" was
made upon dispatching by telex or
upon its receipt. The court of appeals held that the time of dis-
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patch was the time of the demand
for Section 546(c) purposes. In its
opinion, the court considered the
meaning of the term "receipt"
which Congress did not define.
"There is no definition of 'receipt'
in the Bankruptcy Code, but
U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(c) defines receipt of goods as 'taking physical
possession of them.' ''2 1
In a •footnote, the court stated
that its reliance on the UCC "for
determining the time of receipt
does not mean that the definition
of receipt under § 546( c) is a matter of state law and might change
were an individual state to alter its
version of the Uniform Commercial Code . . . . Rather, the Uniform Commercial Code assumes
relevance in this ..regard because,
in adopting Section 546(c), Congress essentially borrowed from
the U.C.C. Thus, we assume
Congress also borrowed the standard definition of receipt contained in the U.C.C."22
Conclusion
Although the court's opinion in
AIC Photo represents a sound and
J?ractical solution to a burdensome problem facing reclaiming
sellers, one which we would like
to see Congress adopt as an
amendment to the Bankruptcy
Code, it is difficult to justify the
use of the UCC insolvency defini-

20 In re Marin Motor Oil, Inc., 740 F.2d
220 (3d Cir. 1984).
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/d. at 224-225.
/d. at 225 n.9.

FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS

tion to construe "insolvent" in
Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code when a different insolvency
definition is contained in the
Bankruptcy Code itself. If AIC
Photo is widely followed, "insolvency" as useo in the Bankruptcy
Code will have different meanings
despite the fact that the statute
contains only one definition; the
balance sheet test will be used for
preference and fraudulent transfer
purposes but the equity test will
be used for reclamation purposes.
On the other hand, reference to
UCC definitions is appropriate in
the absence of a definition contained in the Bankruptcy Code.

However, we cannoJ overlook
the three altematives 23 contained
in the UCC that define 'insolvency. Therefore, since a prepetition reclaiming creditor can
rely on the equity definition to
sustain its case, it should follow
that if bankruptcy ensues before
the goods nave been returned,
such creditor's rights should he
preserved by proof of the equity
definition while the case is pending in bankruptcy.
23 See Official Uniform Comment to
U.C.C. § l-201, No. 23," 'Insolvent.' ..
The three tests of insolvency
are expressly set up as alternative tests and must
be approached from a commercial standpoint."
o
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